[eDebate] Email Conversation with Chester Crocker About T-QPQ

[Andy Ellis]

kudos to dartmouth for posting this in a visable and accesible
forum...its much better than having it at
students.dartmouth.edu/charkins/pages/ccrocker.htm with a no search
tag in the head which they could have done if they where simply after
published ev...

On 2/28/08, Dr. Joe Bellon <debate.gsu at gmail.com> wrote:

> Nothing wrong with e-mailing topic authors, nothing wrong with posting the

> results.

>

> I would, however, like to sound a cautionary note against drawing broad

> conclusions from this particular e-mail. From time to time, we seem to make

> decisions as a community about the truth or falsehood of a topicality issue

> based on our perceptions of "consensus" reached on edebate.

>

> I don't think the Crocker e-mails are aff cards (even apart from the

> question of whether we should be in the practice of reading e-mails in

> debate rounds). JP has laid out a couple of the arguments on this point. I

> think when Crocker says that there was nothing formal or explicit he means

> that there was never a written document. This does not mean that there was

> no condition of any kind. If CE was unconditional, how can we explain his

> discussion of what would happen if CE "failed?" CE clearly had a specific

> goal of producing change in the target country, and it seems problematic to

> allow affs to claim the nature of that change can be found in the penumbra

> of their advantages.

>

> Furthermore, If you read his e-mail as saying that unconditional affs are

> topical, it seems to me those affs have to explicitly keep rollback on the

> table. Crocker argues that part of the strategy of CE was that the target

> country knew that if it didn't do what the US implicitly wanted then we

> would change our policy and start being hardline (his "good cop-bad cop"

> comment). Again, it is obvious from this discussion that CE had a specific

> outcome as a goal. If the plan were modeled off Crocker's description, it

> would include the proviso that failure on the part of the target country to

> meet a specific condition would result in reversal of the plan.

>

> Furthermore, it is interesting to note in the other e-mail in the thread

> that Crocker claims CE means you have to engage every country in the region.

> Of course, if you're willing to have a plan that engages every country in

> the region maybe QPQ isn't the worst of your worries...

>

> Dr. Joe Bellon

> Director of Debate

> Georgia State University

>

> On Wed, Feb 27, 2008 at 11:27 PM, Brent Culpepper <

> brentonculpepper at gmail.com> wrote:

>

> > I agree w/ JP.  Great Research.  It's always quite interesting to see just

> > how much our topic interpretations differ from what the original authors

> > meant by a term of art.  It's part of debate - largely a good part I might

> > add.  We should be doing research up until the end of the topic.  It is

> what

> > makes debate interesting and evolving.  There is nothing questionable

> about

> > this post.

> >

> > brent

> >

> >

> > On Wed, Feb 27, 2008 at 9:57 PM, Jean-Paul Lacy <lacyjp at wfu.edu> wrote:

> >

> > >

> > > Great research!

> > >

> > > My thoughts:

> > >

> > > So, the conditionality of Constructive Engagement with South Africa was

> > > informal and implicit, & the old Crocker article doesn't define

> Constructive

> > > Engagement as a "formal quid pro quo," nor does his definition really

> apply

> > > to Constructive Engagement toward a single government.

> > >

> > > Do the texts of Crocker's email & his "definition" from 1989 make

> > > *purely* unconditional moves topical?

> > >

> > > Maybe not, unless they are communicated to informally imply a reciprocal

> > > "good cop, bad cop" relationship.

> > >

> > > I don't know if "modern" plan-writing is up to Crocker's challenge,

> > > given the way we shy away from articulating broad, strategically

> ambiguous

> > > foreign policy goals as plan texts...

> > >

> > > This is probably another good example of where we haven't really "caught

> > > up" with the literature and instead keep trying to make foreign policy

> with

> > > so much concreteness that it really misses the specific nuances of

> > > diplomacy.

> > >

> > > --JP

> > > lacyjp at wfu.edu

> > >

> > >

> > >

> > > At 09:39 PM 2/27/2008, Kade Olsen wrote:

> > >

> > > Given "definition intent" debate, Caroline Harkins emailed Crocker, Here

> > > is the conversation:

> > >

> > > Caroline,

> > >

> > > you have asked an interesting and somewhat unusual question. The answer

> > > is that a diplomatic strategy such as CE cannot become formal or

> > > explicit without risking getting dragged into the negotiation of an

> > > international understanding or agreement, a treacherous path and one

> > > that could have produced months of lawyerly haggling over words and

> > > interpretations. The conditionality was informal in another sense, too.

> > > If this strategy failed or collapsed in recrimination, the 'other side'

> > > could readily imagine what might replace it. In other words, there was

> > > an implicit good cop, bad cop aspect to the approach we took when

> > > dealing with Pretoria.

> > > Most important to grasp, however, is that CE was a regional diplomatic

> > > strategy focused - in sequential terms - on addressing southern Africa's

> > >

> > > regional conflicts first, and then on its internal ones. The logic was

> > > to engage with the broadest range of regional actors in order to wind

> > > down regional conflicts. So, your question is too narrow - we were not

> > > applying CE only to South Africa or to its govt. These issues are

> > > discussed extensively in High Noon in Southern Africa.

> > >

> > > hope this helps.

> > >

> > > best wishes.

> > >

> > > CAC

> > >

> > > Caroline A. Harkins wrote:

> > > > Dr. Crocker,

> > > >

> > > > I am a policy debater at Dartmouth College and the current debate

> > > > topic focuses on constructive engagement and U.S. Middle East policy.

> > > >

> > > > Given your considerable expertise and personal experience with

> > > > constructive engagement in South Africa, I was wondering if you could

> > > > resolve a few questions I have regarding some ambiguities in the

> > > > historical literature on engagement.

> > > >

> > > > In your 1989 Foreign Affairs article entitled "Southern Africa: Eight

> > > > Years Later," you wrote that the U.S. policy of constructive

> > > > engagement with South Africa was conditional:

> > > >

> > > > "Regarding South Africa, constructive engagement was by definition a

> > > > conditional concept: in exchange for Pretoria's cooperation on

> > > > achieving Namibia's independence, we would work to restructure the

> > > > independence settlement to address our shared interest in reversing

> > > > the Soviet-Cuban adventure in Angola; in exchange for reduced

> > > > rhetorical flagellation and minor adjustments in certain bilateral

> > > > fields (e.g., civilian export controls), we would hold Pretoria to its

> > >

> > > > self-proclaimed commitment to domestic reform. There would be a change

> > >

> > > > of tone toward reciprocity and even-handedness. But there would be no

> > > > change in basic policy parameters on such matters as the U.S.

> > > > opposition to South African apartheid laws and institutions or

> > > > bilateral security ties -- no "rewriting of the past 20 years of U.S.

> > > > diplomacy," as the 1980 article put it -- in the absence of

> > > > fundamental internal change."

> > > >

> > > > When you state that U.S. policy was "by definition a conditional

> > > > concept," do you mean that there were direct conditions placed on the

> > > > government of South Africa?

> > > >

> > > > If so, were those conditions made explicit to the government of South

> > > > Africa. To clarify, for example, would you argue that there was a

> > > > formal quid pro quo with the government, such that there were stated

> > > > incentives that could be provided or denied based on compliance with

> > > > specific U.S. demands? Or was the "conditional concept" of the policy

> > > > informal?

> > > >

> > > > Thank you for your time and consideration. Any information that you

> > > > could provide on this question would be thoroughly appreciated.

> > > >

> > > > Sincerely,

> > > >

> > > > Caroline Harkins

> > >

> > > --

> > > Chester A. Crocker

> > > James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies

> > > Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

> > > Intercultural Center Room 801

> > > Georgetown University

> > > Washington, D.C. 20057

> > > Phone: (202) 687-5074

> > > Fax: (202) 687-2315

> > > Email: crockerc at georgetown.edu

> > >

> > >

> > >

> > >

> > >

> > > Caroline - I have no problem provided you post both your question and my

> > >

> > > response. The reason is that most people assume CE is a strategy for

> > > dealing with one regime that is troubled, isolated, evil, odious,

> > > authoritarian, illegal or whatever. Since South Africa was/is the

> > > dominant power in the region, people ignored the regional point - we

> > > were seeking to engage all those parties that would reciprocate our

> > > diplomatic initiative. In addition, the South African government took

> > > the words 'CE' and proclaimed that the US was engaging with it, a

> > > self-serving distortion. Feel free to post this comment as well if you

> > > like.

> > >

> > > Sincerely,

> > >

> > > CAC

> > >

> > > Caroline A. Harkins wrote:

> > > > Dr. Crocker,

> > > >

> > > > Thank you so much for rapid and thorough response. Given the

> > > > importance of this subject to the debate community's discussion and

> > > > understanding of constructive engagement, would you mind if I shared

> > > > your explanation with other policy debaters interested in this subject

> > >

> > > > on our email listserv?

> > > >

> > > > Sincerely,

> > > >

> > > > Caroline Harkins

> > >

> > > --

> > > Chester A. Crocker

> > > James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies

> > > Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

> > > Intercultural Center Room 801

> > > Georgetown University

> > > Washington, D.C. 20057

> > > Phone: (202) 687-5074

> > > Fax: (202) 687-2315

> > > Email: crockerc at georgetown.edu

> > >

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